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Voters, Institutions and Governance:  
A Theory and Evidence from the Indian Elections in 
2004 
 
PRAKASH SARANGI 
Professor of Political Science1 
 
This paper is a preliminary attempt to understand a simple puzzle about the 
Indian voter: Why does a voter vote for party X or Y in an election? What 
parameters does s/he use to evaluate parties and their policies? Or, does s/he 
look at the parties through the lenses of other cultural institutions? How does 
s/he calculate the payoff to the society and/or to herself/himself in this 
momentous action? This author was amazed by the absence any substantive 
studies on the subject. 
 
Though there are hardly any studies on the Indian voter, there have been several 
electoral studies.2 Most of the studies centre on ‘the verdict’, i.e., why does a 
party win or lose in an election? The explanations generally given are: change 
in a party’s leadership or ideology; cultural factors like change in caste or 
ethnic equations; promises of welfare goodies, anti-incumbency factor, etc. 
None of these explanations provide any space to the role of the voter, who 
actually elects or rejects a party. That a voter has her/his calculations while 
taking the momentous decision is ignored.3 At best, the surveys take note of the 
socio-economic background of a voter, her/his expectations from a government, 
                                                 
1
 University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad 500046 (India), Email: pcsss@uohyd.ernet.in: 
2
 A review of all the research till the elections of 1971-72 is found in Narain (1978). Among the 
recent studies, there are two special issues of Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXIV No. 
34-35, August 21-28, 1999 and Vol.XXXIX, No.51, December 18-24, 2004; and Mitra and 
Singh (1999).   
3
 V.M. Sirsikar, one of the early pioneers of electoral studies in India observes dismissively, 
“An Inquiry into the process of elections indicates factors other than rationality.” (1966: 61) 
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her/his preferences of public policies. However, the voter is never asked 
whether the voter uses any or all of these in her/his evaluation of a party. For 
example, if most of the Dalit voters vote for a party, the conclusion is drawn 
that it is the Dalit identity of the voter, which made her/him to vote for that 
party. It could be that a Dalit votes for that party, not because s/he is a Dalit, but 
because s/he likes a candidate or party’s policies or that her/his payoff will be 
more if that party wins. This is not to under-emphasize the impact of the 
context on the voter. It is important for us to understand that every contextual 
factor may not have influence on the voter. In fact, a voter is flooded with an 
amazing range of information. S/he may have neither time nor inclination to 
understand these. Very often, though, s/he takes note of information filtered 
through cultural and political institutions. In the next section we will present an 
approach to understand the voting behaviour in India.  
 
A Neo-institutional Approach4 to Voting Behaviour 
 
An Indian voter’s behaviour is a function of three parameters: the voter 
him/herself as a human agency; the role of the informal cultural institutions like 
a caste or a religious group; and the role of the formal institutions like a 
political party. It is a triangular relationship between the individual and the 
formal and informal institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure – 1: VOTERS AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
First, the voters’ actions are to be seen as intentional or purposeful. They are 
seen as agents with certain freedom to deliberate and to choose in accordance 
with individual psychology.5 These deliberations, however, take shape in a 
                                                 
4
 A few important works in this area are: Hall and Taylor 1996; March and Olson 1984; Nielsen 
2001; North 1990; and Powell and DiMaggio 1991. 
5
 There is an occasional skepticism about the deliberative capacities of many Indian voters who 
are uneducated. Deliberation has no relationship with literacy. Every individual’s horizon of 
thinking has a limit.  A farmer in rural India will not be expected to evaluate India’s role in 
WTO; nor a stockbroker in Mumbai be interested in local irrigation policy. Given a voter’s 
context, if s/he is able to analyze the information and decide, s/he is a rational calculating being. 
Our experience tells us that Indian voters in rural areas are far more sophisticated in their 
political calculations compared to educated urban dwellers. 
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specific political and cultural context. Thus the voters are not always 
maximizing ‘economic men’. Their utility functions are not the sole guiding 
factors.6 Their behaviours are guided by the rules of informal and formal 
institutions. Actors follow habits and rules, not because of calculated costs and 
benefits, but because it is sensible and necessary to do so. The transaction costs 
(North 1991) get reduced. The transaction costs may take many forms: presence 
of extensive information or lack thereof, complexity and uncertainty of issues, 
problems of cognition, learning and communication, language of political 
interaction, etc.7 
 
Voting mechanically -- according to one’s ideology or caste identity -- is 
sometimes regarded as different from a rational voting behaviour. However, to 
vote according to one’s cultural affiliation or according to what seems to be 
appropriate or reasonable may seem to be a rational response to a specific 
situation. One’s payoff in terms of friendship or community obligations may be 
more than an electoral pay-off. Sometimes present behaviour may be linked to 
the past behaviour. Legitimizing past action is neither inappropriate nor 
irrational. Social interaction is necessary to make sense of uncertain future and 
to develop reasonable expectations.8 Rationality is not independent of specific 
situational context. Institutions do not act as constraints, but rather enable the 
actors to define the contours of rationality.  
 
Voting behaviour is mediated by formal or informal institutions. Institutions 
have an inherent agenda-setting role. “Institutions are the structure that humans 
impose on human interaction and therefore define the incentives that … 
determine the choices that individuals make.” (North 1994) Institutions 
determine the nature of transactions and the payoffs to the transacting parties. 
They also help individuals to take decisions by reducing transaction costs. 
Cultural context generates informal institutions. The examples of such 
institutions may be a religious group, caste solidarity or a tribal identity.9 
Culturally embedded institutions provide frames of meaning that determine 
how problems are defined and how possible solutions are identified and 
evaluated. (Scott 1996)  
 
                                                 
6
 In the Indian context we know that an individual may get greater pleasure by sacrificing 
interests rather than by maximizing them. There may be satisfaction while helping someone, be 
it a candidate in the election. 
7
 Transaction costs for an Indian voter are very high. In a huge multi-ethnic country, even the 
local issues are fairly complex. Political languages (not in linguistic sense) may vary. Ethnic 
groups, kinship ties or political organizations simplify this jigsaw puzzle for the voters. 
8
 In India, a vote – perhaps like any other commodity – does not enjoy a purely private space. It 
may be exchanged for past friendship or future loyalty. It is sometimes owned as a collective 
good and used for the solidarity of the community. It is wrong to suggest that voting as an act of 
exchange is irrational. Perhaps an individual derives more payoffs from such an exchange.  
9
 In India, the smallest social institution, which may be influencing voting decision, is the 
family. Occasionally the scholars are puzzled by the fact that a whole family votes for the same 
candidate or that a wife simply follows the husband’s decision. These actions will not sound 
irrational, if we accept the transaction cost theory of institutional analysis.  
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Formal institutions in the political process carry out the role of interest 
articulation and aggregation. Political parties and interest groups are the typical 
examples of such institutions. Traditional rational choice literature views them 
as supply side institutions analogous to the firms in a market. They present their 
policies before the voters, who exchange their votes with the promised policies. 
A voter’s decision is presumed to be autonomous. A political party is seen 
simply as the aggregation of the preferences of individuals.10 Such a model 
ignores the institution’s autonomy and resilience. It also ignores the linkages 
between the political institutions and the cultural institutions. Both the types of 
institutions not only influence the voters, they also influence each other. There 
may be formal and informal contracts between the two to support each other. In 
some cases the identity of the two types of institutions may become 
indistinguishable from each other.11 
 
Political Change 
 
The sources of change in political institutions are the opportunities and costs 
perceived by the political entrepreneurs12 in altering the framework. The 
entrepreneur assesses the gains to be derived from a new contract within the 
existing institutional framework compared to the gains from devoting resources 
to changing that framework. The entrepreneurs who perceive themselves and 
their organizations as relative losers in the political market can turn to other 
political units for a renegotiation of a contract and alter the rules of the game. In 
political games most of the changes happen informally: by changing the norms, 
conventions, etc. Changes occur gradually and quite often subconsciously as 
individuals evolve alternative patterns of behaviour consistent with their newly 
perceived evaluation of costs and benefits. The change is largely incremental, 
since accepted norms and social conventions change slowly.13 The critical 
actors in the times of change are the political entrepreneurs whose payoffs are 
likely to increase in creating new organizations or transforming the existing 
ones. They create a new support base or gently persuade the existing supporters 
to view the issues differently because of anticipated higher payoffs. The 
                                                 
10
 For the most part of India’s political history since independence, examples of such political 
parties are hard to find. Political parties have been supply-driven, rather than demand-driven. 
The opinions or values of members – or, of voters -- have rarely been translated as the policy of 
a party.   
11
 In the context of the interaction between caste and political institutions in India, Rajni 
Kothari described the process as a democratic incarnation of caste system. More recently, Seth 
has explained this as secularization of caste system. The process has reached a culmination in 
the emergence of political parties depending on the support from one or a few caste groups. 
(Kothari 1970; Sheth 1999; Chandra 2004) 
12
 There have been many such entrepreneurs in Indian politics. One example of a very 
successful entrepreneur is Indira Gandhi who was instrumental in transforming the Congress 
party in 1969. An example of unsuccessful entrepreneur is Jaiprakash Narayan, who failed to 
translate the massive anti-Congress sentiment to a resilient political formation.  
13
 When Indira Gandhi moved away from the notion of a party of consensus and generated her 
rainbow coalition, it took quite a while for people to realize the potential of payoff based on 
social welfare.  
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political entrepreneurs reduce transaction costs of their supporters by providing 
adequate information on alternatives and a promise of better payoff in future.14  
 
It is thus a symbiotic relation between the individuals and the institutions in 
politics. Institutions exist because of the support they derive from individuals. 
Institutions help the individuals to deliberate by providing the structured 
information. Individual’s use of information for the sake of voting behaviour 
may be a routinised or a strategic behaviour. It is routinised when s/he is guided 
by the values, norms or ideologies derived from the cultural or political 
institutions with which s/he is associated. Very little calculation of payoff takes 
place. Culture is so much a part of an individual that s/he may not sometimes be 
aware that her/his actions are influenced by the information provided by the 
cultural institutions. An individual may be close to the values or ideology of a 
political party or interest group and may uncritically accept their opinion.15 
Transaction cost is minimal in such cases. These are incremental path 
dependent models of decision-making.16 The individuals may have no incentive 
to make additional investment in gathering information, since their expected 
payoffs from the political system are not likely to increase.  
 
The second type of behaviour – strategic behaviour – may be discernible when 
the individual exercises autonomy in decision-making. S/he gathers information 
and analyses them before taking a decision. S/he may be getting clues from 
institutions; but accepts or rejects them only after an objective analysis.17 This 
is an empowering process for the individual. S/he takes a decision only after 
calculating payoffs, both to her/himself as well as to the collective. At this stage 
the institutions, instead of taking the individuals for granted, would like to woo 
them at the latter’s own terms. 
 
It is the political parties who seek the support from individuals during elections. 
A party may appeal directly to the individuals or may create linkages through 
                                                 
14
 The cost of transacting arises because information is costly and asymmetrically held by 
parties to exchange. The instrumental rationality postulate assumes that the actors possess 
information necessary to evaluate the alternatives. Such a postulate is not sustainable in the 
political market, which is never a perfect market. Hence, the need for allowance for the cost of 
transaction in a political exchange. Institutional innovators have often absorbed the transaction 
cost of the individuals as a part of their payoffs.    
15
 Uncritical acceptance of a party in India’s history has happened for several decades after 
independence. The Congress party continued to get support for quite some time as a party, 
which led the nationalist movement, and later on as a party which can remove poverty. Several 
such examples can be found at the State level: CPM in West Bengal, NTR’s TDP in Andhra 
Pradesh, RJD in Bihar or BJP in Gujarat. 
16
 It is not simply ideology that simplifies the decision-making. Sometimes it is the historical 
continuity in support because of the charisma of a leader or a family or simply the continuity of 
caste equation with a party. 
17
 Such a discerning voter has emerged in the Indian politics during the last couple of decades. 
This is evident from the fact that voters are asking questions about the policies on offer, 
throwing out nonperforming parties and have been sophisticated enough to vote for one party 
for the State and for another party for the Centre.  
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social and cultural institutions. Such linkages could be integrated or 
differentiated. When political and cultural institutions become so 
indistinguishable that each risks losing its autonomy in decision-making they 
may be said to be integrated.18 On the other hand, they are differentiated when 
maintain a clear separation, while influencing each other for electoral purposes. 
 
Pay-off to the Voter: Fair Governance 
 
The pay-off to the Indian voter comes in the form of what we may call ‘fair 
governance’.  Broadly, governance implies process in which a political system 
operates.19 It is the flip side of politics. When a set of individuals with 
conflicting demands and values come together and take decisions in reasonable 
manners that are considered binding for the collective, there is said to be 
politics. The expectation is to have a stable order and not chaos. When 
collective decisions are translated into practice through institutional 
mechanisms as defined in the decision, the issue of governance comes to the 
picture. Governance, therefore, does not simply mean ‘governing’; but whether 
governing has happened in a reasonable manner as expected in the collective 
decision. If election in a representative democracy were to be seen as an 
instrument of collective decision making for a country, expectations of 
outcomes from the policies of an elected government would constitute what is 
called ‘governance’. The achievement needs to match reasonably with the 
expectation. It is this comparison that defines the pay-off for the voters, at least 
for the majority that elected a government. 
 
If governance, broadly defined, means translating electoral promises into 
effective public policies in a representative democracy, most of countries would 
be categorized as governance-less. No winning party can keep all its electoral 
promises. Therefore, a voter needs to assess broad themes of performance of a 
government, a minimal payoff, without which the democratic regime may lose 
its legitimacy. This minimal payoff may be characterized as ‘fair’ governance, a 
level of governance, which may be considered as reasonably fair. Within any 
single democratic country the meaning of what constitutes fairness may vary 
from time to time. In fact, each historical regime may be defined by a theme of 
fair governance.  
 
Electoral history in India (1952-2004) can be divided into three such regimes of 
fair governance. During 1952-1967, the dominant theme and minimal payoff 
for Indian voters was to generate a stable political order. Nationalist sentiment 
                                                 
18
 The negotiation of a ‘contract’ between the political parties and cultural and ethnic institution 
has been there for some time. In the absence of any associational groups, they have been 
convenient modes of political mobilization. However, a caste or ethnic group does not always 
accept a party uncritically, especially in the recent past. Examples of negotiation and bargaining 
on payoff have become quite common.  
19
 Different meanings of governance and operationalization of the concept can be found in 
Mitra 2006. 
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was the binding force and an elected government was expected to provide a 
feeling of national integration. Gradually, the differentiated political parties 
made promises of welfare to their own supporters rather than for the whole 
country. Dispensing competitive welfare became the new rule of the electoral 
game during 1967-1989. 1990s witnessed a period of participatory upsurge 
leading to a politics of recognition of ethnic identities. Effective participation in 
power sharing game was the primary payoff. 
 
If payoffs or anticipated payoffs are used to elect a party to power, then 2004 
elections seems to call for a discussion on the regime change. It broke away 
from the phase of empowering governance. Though it is premature to capture a 
trend, one may suggest that it has entered into a phase of Responsive 
Governance, where a party may assess the needs of the people and respond by 
means of its public policies. Whereas initiative for welfare comes from a party 
or the state, in case of responsive governance the initiative comes from the 
people. The voters behave strategically to punish the parties if they do not 
deliver according to their wishes, even if the party may be otherwise acceptable 
to the people. (Figure 2)  
 
 
Cultural and Political Institutions 
Integrated             Differentiated 
Stabilising 
Governance 
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Governance 
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Figure 2: VOTERS, INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 
 
 
2004 Election and Responsive Governance 
 
Yogendra Yadav (2004) describes the results of 2004 election as a ‘puzzle’ and 
a ‘paradox’. He writes, “The puzzle relates to apparent disconnect of the final 
outcome not just with the pre-poll expectations, but also with the popular 
perception of the central government, the popularity of the then prime minister, 
the undoubted strength of the BJP’s electoral and organizational machine when 
compared to the Congress.” (Yadav 2004: 5383) The mandate did not appear to 
be dramatic since the election “was in no way a ‘critical’ election that changed 
the long-term patterns of political alignment and the structure of political 
competition in the country.” (Yadav 2004: 5397) Yadav finds the results 
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paradoxical because the traditional explanatory variables of a verdict – 
leadership, party organization, ideology, caste or religious identities – do not 
seem to be electorally salient. The main fallacy in this conclusion is to rely too 
much on the supply-side variables. Yadav does not take into account the 
changes in the voters’ criteria to evaluate the performance of the parties. 
Perhaps the expectations of the voter from the government are changing. 
 
One may argue that 2004 election is the beginning of a new era for a voter’s 
calculations of her/his payoff by deciding strategically at a time when political 
parties are moving beyond mobilization of votes based on cultural or ethnic 
identities. It is wrong to call this phase as one of secular mobilization, since the 
proclaimed secular parties try to use religion for electoral purposes. 
Calculations of payoff shift from the Empowering Governance to Responsive 
Governance because of the following reasons. The three famous M’s of 1990s – 
Mandal, Mandir and Market – began to disintegrate.20 There has been a 
realization that securing support from one or a few caste groups are not 
adequate for electoral purposes. A caste-group will not give unstinted support 
forever, as has been seen in case of BSP. Performance matters for continued 
support. Similarly, BJP realized that radical Hindutva could alienate moderate 
Hindus. If it has to get full support at national level, it has to accommodate the 
needs of other religious groups. Other political parties also realized that they 
couldn’t alienate all the Hindus, which constitutes the majority of the 
population. Hindutva, for or against, no longer became an electoral plank. BJP 
had to indulge in ‘India shining’ campaign, which unfortunately failed to 
impress voters. Liberalization of economic market is not BJP’s baby, in any 
case. Now there is a consensus about the existence of economic reform in India. 
BJP being the ruling party got trapped and received all the flak for that India 
which is not shining. The debate on market turned to an assessment of 
performance of BJP. 
 
Political parties in 2004 tell a story of gradual withdrawal from linkages with 
cultural groups and display of one’s performance and capabilities. The 
Congress party did not lose any chance to recall its good performance in earlier 
decades. Smaller parties cited their experience of being in the government at the 
state or the local levels. Reports from campaigns at local levels tell us that, 
local issues – be it roads, electricity or water – became electorally salient issues. 
Thus, there are strong reasons to believe that issues of governance – primarily, 
performance – were being assessed by the individual voters. The political 
parties were responding to this development. 
 
Our hypothesis is that individual voters in 2004 assessed responsiveness of BJP 
towards the needs of governance. We will test this hypothesis in two steps. 
First, we will show that the traditional explanatory variables like caste, religion, 
leadership, and perception of overall performance do not explain BJP’s defeat. 
                                                 
20
 For a succinct summary of issues before the Indian democracy, see Kothari 2004. 
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The second step is to assess the calculations that might have gone in the minds 
of voters regarding BJP’s response to the needs of governance. Ideally this step 
should be tested with both qualitative and quantitative data. In the absence of 
the former we will rely on the variables, which are operationalized by voter’s 
satisfaction in financial matters. All the data used for testing the hypothesis are 
from National Election Study 2004 conducted by Lokniti of the Centre for the 
Study of Developing Societies, Delhi.21    
 
 
Traditional Explanatory Variables 
 
In the Indian electoral studies, caste identity has often been used to explain 
voting decisions. There is reason to believe that there is a change in that trend. 
In 2004, only 9.5% of those interviewed by CSDS said that caste/community is 
the most important consideration while voting, whereas in 1996, 29% gave 
importance to caste. 
 
Table – 1: One Should Vote in the Same Way as Caste/Community 
 
 Agree (%) Disagree (%) 
UPA voters 36.3 36.3 
NDA voters 33.7 38.3 
Others 29.9 25.4 
N 8806 11072 
Source: NES 2004 of CSDS 
 
Those who agree that one should vote in the same way as caste/community are 
almost evenly distributed among the UPA and NDA voters. This is true about 
those who disagree as well. (Table – 1) Caste identity may have an instrumental 
value as in the case of reservation of jobs. We find in Table - 2 that opinion on 
this is evenly divided between both the UPA and NDA voters. This implies that 
caste identity of the voters has very little impact on the final verdict of the 
election. 
 
Table – 2: There should not be Caste-based Reservation in Jobs 
 
 Agree (%) Disagree (%) 
UPA voters 35.2 38.2 
NDA voters 38.2 34.9 
Others 26.6 26.9 
N 10063 8761 
Source: NES 2004 of CSDS 
 
                                                 
21
 The author is grateful to Mr. Sanjay Kumar and Mr. Himansu Bhattacharya for their help in 
providing the data on behalf the CSDS. 
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It is the same story when we use religious identity as an explanatory variable. 
We used two indicators: a voter’s attitude towards each community having 
separate civil code (Table – 3) and opinion on the government’s responsibility 
in protecting the minorities (Table – 4). A religious minded person (especially 
one belonging to minority religions) is expected to answer in the affirmative. In 
the whole population, substantially more numbers of people agree compared to 
those who disagree, implying that there are more religious-minded than secular-
minded people. However, both religious-minded and secular-minded almost 
evenly distributed among the UPA and NDA voters. This implies that religious 
identity may not be an important explanatory variable.  
 
Table – 3: Every Community Should be Allowed to have its Own Laws to 
Govern Marriage and Property Rights 
 
 Agree (%) Disagree (%) 
UPA voters 36.0 37.1 
NDA voters 34.7 39.0 
Others 29.3 23.9 
N 12229 6140 
Source: NES 2004 of CSDS 
 
 
Table – 4: Protecting the Interests of the Minorities is the Responsibility of the 
Govt 
 
 Agree (%) Disagree (%) 
UPA voters 37.5 32.6 
NDA voters 35.4 40.1 
Others 27.1 27.3 
N 14370 2908 
Source: NES 2004 of CSDS 
 
In the voters’ evaluation of the Congress and the BJP (Table – 5), the BJP 
seems to have a slight edge. One need to pay a special attention to the 
perception BJP has good leaders. Even at the end of his term as the Prime 
Minister, Vajpayee’s ratings as a leader were high and invariably higher than 
Sonia Gandhi. 
 
Table – 5: Which Party is better? 
 
 Congress BJP No 
Difference 
No 
Opinion 
N 
For Curbing 
Corruption 
 
30.0 32.3 20.4 17.3 22549 
For Good 33.9 36.2 14.4 15.4 22551 
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Governance/ 
administration 
For Good 
Leaders 
 
31.7 38.3 13.8 16.3 22548 
For 
Eradicating 
Terrorism 
26.0 35.2 15.7 23.0 22548 
Source: NES 2004 of CSDS 
 
 
The NDA government (1999-2004) is the first coalition government in India 
which completed its full five-year term. Voters’ evaluation of NDA government 
on five important parameters is given in Table-6. About two-thirds of the 
respondents thought that the condition of India remained the same or has 
improved in curbing corruption, security of the country, maintaining her image 
in the world, ensuring Hindu-Muslim brotherhood and in overall development 
of the country. Only about 29% of the respondents were dissatisfied or fully 
dissatisfied with the NDA government (Table – 7). Surprisingly, 49% of UPA 
voters were satisfied or fully satisfied with NDA government. 
 
 
Table – 6: Evaluation of NDA Govt 
 
 Deteriorated Same as 
before 
Improved No 
Opinion 
N 
Curbing 
Corruption 
 
22.4 30.3 30.4 16.9 22551 
Security of 
the Country 
 
13.5 24.5 43.1 18.9 22548 
Image of 
India in the 
World 
13.6 24.3 43.2 18.9 22549 
Hindu-
Muslim 
Brotherhood 
18.5 28.1 33.4 20.0 22549 
Development 
of the 
Country 
13.1 23.3 44.8 18.8 22549 
Source: NES 2004 of CSDS 
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Table – 7: Satisfaction with NDA Govt (in %) 
 
 All Voters UPA Voters NDA Voters Others 
Fully Satisfied 21 11 37 13 
Satisfied 37 38 38 35 
Dissatisfied 11 14 7 11 
Totally 
Dissatisfied 
18 24 6 25 
Can’t say 14 14 11 16 
N 22568 8537 8402 5629 
Source: NES 2004 of CSDS as reported in EPW, 2004, p.5395. 
 
Can there a Different Explanation? 
 
The question is: why did NDA lose in 2004? How to explain the voting 
behaviour of those who voted for UPA and against NDA? Our hunch is that the 
traditional explanatory variables of voting behaviour are no longer relevant. 
One has to go beyond the explanations based on socio-cultural context or 
evaluation of party and the leader. Perhaps the voter is calculating her/his own 
payoff while voting for a party. It is difficult to test this proposition in the 
absence of individual level data on the subject. We have tried to use a proxy 
variable in the form of economic gains from the policies from NDA 
government. This is a poor substitute of the individual’s calculation of payoffs; 
but will give us some idea whether our hunch is in the right direction or not. 
 
Table – 8 contains the perception of voters on two important issues: economic 
condition and employment opportunities after five years of NDA government. 
Among those who thought that economic conditions have deteriorated 42% 
have voted for UPA and 26% voted for NDA. Among those who thought that 
the economic condition has improved, 30% voted for UPA and 45% voted for 
NDA. One can see a similar pattern among those who thought that employment 
opportunities have deteriorated or improved. Though payoffs to voters need not 
always be in the form of economic gains, the economic variables are the easiest 
to capture the mood of the voters. Table – 8 gives us enough indication that 
payoff to the voter could be an important determinant of the decision to vote for 
a party.   
 
Table – 8: Perception of Voters on the Economic Conditions (in %) 
 
 UPA Voters NDA Voters Others N 
Economic 
Conditions 
    
Deteriorated 42 26 32 4213 
Same as before 38 35 27 11586 
Improved 30 45 25 6032 
No Opinion 35 28 37 719 
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Employment 
Opportunities 
    
Deteriorated 42 29 29 9344 
Same as before 36 37 27 6154 
Improved 26 52 22 3920 
No opinion 36 32 32 3131 
Source: NES 2004 of CSDS, as reported in EPW, 2004, p.5407 
 
Conclusion 
  
Electoral studies in India have neglected the role of ‘the voter’ while analyzing 
political change. Scholarly interest centres on the electoral verdict with a host 
of cultural, structural or functional explanations. On the other hand, a rational 
actor model may not explain enough, since several socio-cultural institutions 
play a mediating role for the Indian voter. Hence, a neo-institutional approach 
to voting behaviour is presented in this paper. A three-dimensional relationship 
is suggested: a voter’s relationship with cultural and political institutions; a 
cultural institution’s relationship with voters and with political institutions; and 
a political institution’s relationship with voters and with cultural institutions. 
Each player has some autonomy to influence the others, but each one is 
dependent others for a payoff. Therefore, no relationship is constant. It changes 
whenever there is an anticipation of a higher payoff from a different 
relationship. This results in political change. 
 
We have argued that a voter evaluates her/his payoff in the form of governance, 
i.e., translation of electoral promises into effective public policies. A minimal 
payoff, without which a regime loses its legitimacy, is characterized as fair 
governance. Each democratic regime has its notion of fair governance, 
depending on the triangular relationship between individuals, cultural entities 
and political institutions. We have argued that there have been three such 
regimes in India with different emphases on governance: Stabilizing 
governance (1952-67), Welfarist governance (1967-89) and Empowering 
governance (1989-2004). There is considerable overlapping among the phases 
and geographic variations; but it tells us a story of political change based on the 
expected payoff to the voters. 
 
We hypothesized that 2004 election may be showing the symptoms of a regime 
change, which we tentatively described as Responsive governance. Voters are 
perhaps calculating their own payoffs while voting strategically, rather than 
routinely aligning with cultural and political institutions. On the other hand, 
political parties are showing signs of moving beyond mobilization of votes 
based on cultural and ethnic identities. This was tested with survey data 
collected by CSDS in 2004. First, we found that the earlier explanatory 
variables like caste, religion, performance and incumbency do not hold good. 
Second, a voter’s evaluation of her/his personal well being in the form of 
economic benefits has made a difference to the final choice. Though this is not 
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a conclusive proof of a regime change, there seems to be some indication that 
voters are moving away from caste or religious considerations and are 
analyzing their own payoffs. Any generalization needs to be further 
substantiated by qualitative data that could evaluate the changing psyche of the 
voters in India.  
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